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Editor: D. BarceloThis study re-analysed 14 semi-structured interviews with policy ofﬁcials from the UK Department for Environ-
ment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) to explore the use of a variety of regulatory instruments and different levels
of risk across 14 policy domains and 18 separately named risks. Interviews took place within a policy environ-
ment of a better regulation agenda and of broader regulatory reform. Of 619 (n) coded references to 5 categories
of regulatory instrument, ‘command and control’ regulation (n=257) and supportmechanisms (n=118) dom-
inated the discussions, with a preference for ‘command and control’ cited in 8 of the policy domains. A framing
analysis revealed ofﬁcials' views on instrument effectiveness, including for sub-categories of the 5 key instru-
ments. Views were mixed, though notably positive for economic instruments including taxation, ﬁscal instru-
ments and information provision. An overlap analysis explored ofﬁcials' mapping of public environmental risks
to instrument types suited to their management. While ofﬁcials frequently cite risk concepts generally within
discussions, the extent of overlap for risks of speciﬁc signiﬁcance was low across all risks. Only ‘command and
control’ was mapped to risks of moderate signiﬁcance in likelihood and impact severity. These results show
that policy makers still prefer ‘command and control’ approaches when a certainty of outcome is sought and
that alternative means are sought for lower risk situations. The detailed reasons for selection, including themap-
ping of certain instruments to speciﬁc risk characteristics, is still developing.
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1.1. Policy context
Around the world, policy makers choose a range of policy and regula-
tory instruments to achieve their governments' environmental and eco-
nomic objectives (Hood et al., 2001; Esty and Porter, 2005). ‘Regulation’,
in its broadest sense, includes all forms of social control, including those
that harness forces beyond government, such as the inﬂuence of busi-
nesses and other actors in society (Gunningham and Sinclair, 1998,
1999; Gunningham, 2009, 2011). ‘Instruments’ refer to one component
of regulation, such as licensing, taxes or public information campaigns. In-
struments include conventional direct regulation based on licensing and
inspection; economic instruments suchas taxes and subsidies; approaches
to changing behaviour through better information provision; and ap-
proaches negotiated between government and industry, relying on indus-
try self-regulation and seeking to increase knowledge and capacity.
Direct (‘command and control’) regulation has delivered signiﬁcant
environmental improvements in industrialised nations. It has been ap-
plied widely for circumstances where a certainty of regulatory outcome
is desired; as a back stop to prevent ‘free-loaders’; where there is a need
for actors to adopt measures quickly; and to secure public conﬁdence
when combinedwith a system to ensure implementation. However, con-
cern itmay inhibit innovation and international competitiveness (Cabinet
Ofﬁce, 1999; Heyes, 2009; Rennings and Rammer, 2011; Iraldo et al.,
2011) has led governments to seek alternatives (Obama, 2011;
Australian Government Department of Finance and Deregulation, 2013;
Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2013a, b, c) and to target
regulation using risk-based approaches (e.g. Pollard et al., 2004, 2008;
Hampton, 2005; Gouldson et al., 2009). In practice, instruments rarely op-
erate in isolation; instead forming a complementary mix inﬂuencing be-
haviours through different levers and across multiple actors.
Furthermore, the genesis of regulations may dictate the approach to be
taken (e.g.) European-derived legislation may require a ‘command and
control’ approach to be taken; whereas certain economic instruments,
such as taxes, can only be introduced by the treasury of the state; and
other approaches may require cross-departmental agreement.With vari-
ous changes occurring to themix of instruments used, commentators ob-
serve a shift from government to governance, as alternative or mixed
strategies are deployed for the protection of environmental goods and
services (Jordan et al., 2005; Gouldson, 2008) and for the sharedmanage-
ment of public risk and the associated costs (e.g. MacDonald et al., 2011).
The European Commission (2010) has a long-established pro-
gramme for regulatory reform across its Member States and has sought
to progress the ‘better regulation’ agenda towards so-called ‘smart reg-
ulation’ (European Commission, 2010). The Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) has promoted similar reforms
(OECD, 1995, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2012). Emerging economies
experiencing rapid industrialisation and growth are designing effective
regulatory frameworks to deliver sustainable development (see Mejia,
2009). For example, China endorsed its Plan for Energy Conservation
and Emission Reduction for the 12th Five-Year Plan (Ministry of
Environmental Protection People's Republic of China, 2012), which in-
cluded strengthened pollution controls and reduction targets for spe-
ciﬁc sectors, as well as the promotion of environmental management
labels for vehicles.
The UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)
develops environmental policy and, with its agencies, regulation across
multiple and complex policy domains. Regulation is implemented by
Defra's network of agencies including the Environment Agency (EA)
and also its regulators in local government. Programmes of regulatory re-
form have been pursued by successive UK governments (Cabinet Ofﬁce,
1999; HM Government, 2011, 2012). For example, the ‘Red Tape Chal-
lenge’ (Defra, 2012; Cabinet Ofﬁce, 2013) sought to reduce regulatory
burdens through a process in which policy makers, politicians and the
public scrutinized existing legislation to identify ‘what should be scrapped,what should be saved and what should be simpliﬁed’. Simultaneously, the
UK government sought to reduce government spending while devolving
more decision-making to a local level, including through voluntary civic
action (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011).
Policy makers and regulators face the challenge of selecting suitable
instruments and implementation approaches: to meet multiple objec-
tives of reducing risk; encouraging clean growth; reducing the bureau-
cracy associated with regulation; and for protecting and improving
environmental quality. They can be hampered in their pursuit of ‘evi-
dence based policy’ (Solesbury, 2001) by a lack of evidence on which
policy and regulatory instruments work, why, when and with whom
(Taylor et al., 2012), hence our motive to explore factors inﬂuencing
the effectiveness of instruments in practice, to assist policy makers in
delivering better regulation.
1.2. Better regulation, by design
Regulation is in transition (Cabinet Ofﬁce, 2017). For environmental
protection, recognition of the need to manage organisational gover-
nance and behaviours, in addition to limiting point source and diffuse
releases to the environment, has prompted a wide discussion of instru-
ment effectiveness. Policy makers and regulators have a diverse palette
of instruments (Fig. 1) to select from, for effecting change by reference
to risk (see caption) and other factors (Taylor et al., 2012, 2013, 2015).
Notwithstanding the various policy units established to rethink ‘bet-
ter’, ‘smarter’ and ‘lighter-touch’ regulation (Environment Agency,
2011; Defra, 2013; Department for Business Innovation and Skills,
2013a, b, c), there appears a mismatch between the polemic on what
is desired through these initiatives and the capacity of stakeholders to
deliver ﬂeet-of-foot solutions (Jordan et al., 2003; Rothstein et al.,
2006).We have previously commented on instrument selection criteria
(Taylor et al., 2012); factors inﬂuencing instrument choice (Taylor et al.,
2013); and business preferences for regulatory reform (Taylor et al.,
2015). Important aspects for the selection of any instrument (Fig. 1) in-
clude: (i) the market failure at play that warrants intervention; (ii) the
nature of the environmental hazard whether to, or from the environ-
ment, and the consequences that might ensue if that hazard is realised,
taking into account the state of the environment at risk; (iii) the likeli-
hood of the consequences being realised, given themarket or regulatory
controls already in place – the so-called ‘residual risk’; (iv) the nature, or
character of the associated harms that might ensue from residual risks,
how they are expressed, through which environmental compartments
(air, water, soil, biota) and with what end result(s); (v) the opportuni-
ties to intervene at source, or along the point of hazard realisation
(pathway) or at the receptor; (vi) the relative inﬂuences of individual
human error, organisational behaviour, technological failure, or system
failure on the probability of the hazard being realised (Defra, 2011a);
and, critically (vii) the desired environmental outcome. These aspects
of risk thinking, as they relate to the regulatory craft (Gouldson et al.,
2009; Sparrow, 2000, 2008) have become woven into policy design in
many nations, not least within regulatory impact appraisal
(Kirkpatrick and Parker, 2007; HM Treasury, 2003), with its attempts
to quantify cost-beneﬁt quotients for interventions by reference to
their intended environmental beneﬁts.
In our research, Taylor (2013) has commented on the adoption of
risk concepts by policy ofﬁcials designing interventions, notably in the
context of contaminated land, soil erosion, animal and plant disease
control, climate change adaptation planning, chemicals regulation,
ﬂood risk management, reservoir safety and infrastructure investment.
Risk characteristics that reportedly inﬂuenced the choice of instruments
included (Taylor, 2013):
(i) the spatial characteristics of risk (13 respondents): risks that vary
spatially required local assessments of risk (e.g. ﬂooding, land
contamination, diffuse pollution, biodiversity, river pollution)
and possibly national coordination or international agreements
Fig. 1. Summary of options for instrument selection. In this study, we collapse instrument types 3 (co-regulation) and 5 (civic and self-regulation) into a single category. Taylor (2013)
previously hypothesised a mapping of risk characterisations (High, Moderate, Low) to these instrument categories (column 3, Fig. 1).
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(ii) the risk character (13 respondents): risks with severe impacts
were argued to require more certain measures to control them,
normally through direct regulation (e.g. reservoir safety,
chemicals, pesticides, air pollution, drinking water quality, re-
lease of invasive species);
(iii) the receptor(s) affected (6 respondents): where the impact of a
risk is constrained to the person or business causing the risk, it
was argued that government need not intervene. However,
where risks caused by one party imposed impacts on others (e.g.
the introduction of animal or plant disease) or where risks to soci-
ety remain unmanaged (e.g. risks arising from climate change not
managed by private sector organisations) it was argued that gov-
ernment intervention may be justiﬁed on market failure grounds;
(iv) the complexity of actors and mitigation actions required (3 re-
spondents): for issues such as soil management, climate change
adaptation planning and diffuse pollution, more complex ap-
proaches using a range of interventions targeted at different actors
were reported to often be necessary;
(v) existing understandings of risk (6 respondents): risks that are not
well understood (e.g. engineered nanomaterials) require different
regulatory approaches compared to well understood risks. Inter-
viewees discussed precautionary approaches or securing a better
evidence base before direct regulation was adopted;
(vi) persistence and irreversibility (3 respondents): some impacts per-
sist in the environment, or are irreversible (e.g. some chemicals, in-
vasive species) in which case stronger controls to reduce residual
risk were reported to be appropriate;
(vii) the speed of action required (3 respondents):where rapid govern-
ment action was required, say to control the spread of animal dis-
ease after an outbreak, direct regulation was argued to be
necessary, alongside contingency planning and skills development
to improve emergency response. Flood risk management also re-
quires measures (e.g. emergency planning, ﬂood alerts) to enable
a rapid response.These high level observations suggested a nuanced understanding of
risk concepts among policy ofﬁcials. An extensive literature exists on
the relationship between the characteristics of risks and the forms of reg-
ulation appropriate to managing them (e.g. Klinke and Renn, 2002;
Pollard et al., 2004) and our preliminary results suggested concepts
from economics (e.g. Perman et al., 2003) and risk analysis (e.g. Kaplan,
1997; Short, 1984) were used by policy makers at Defra to conceptualize
explanations for instrument selection, but to varying degrees by different
interviewees. This could indicate that economic and risk theory are of
varying relevance in different policy domains; or that expertise and expe-
rience in risk and economics is not spread evenly among policy makers;
or even that in some domains, therewas a deliberate avoidance of techni-
cal terminology to aid the clarity of communication. In our preliminary
analysis, we concluded (Taylor, 2013; Taylor et al., 2013) that policy ofﬁ-
cials generally considered direct regulation necessary in circumstances
where high impact public risks occurred. Scope for alternative approaches
to direct regulation, where residual risks may still be high, depended on
the strength of supply chain relationships; the capacity and motivation
of the business sector to self-regulate; the strength of political commit-
ment to regulation and non-direct regulatory approaches; and the expo-
sure of businesses in the sector to public and non-governmental
organisation (NGO) scrutiny (Taylor, 2013). In addition, certainmeasures
such as taxes and other ﬁscal instruments may be the remit of the Trea-
sury, rather than the environment department, or may demand cross-
departmental inputs, inwhich case the viewsof onedepartment's ofﬁcials
may not offer a complete picture.
1.3. Objectives and research questions
Our long-standing interest has been the framing of, and connection
between, the themes of market failure, intended outcomes, risk charac-
terisation and instrument selection; and the deep understanding, or
otherwise, of these by the actors involved (Dahlstrom et al., 2003;
Gouldson et al., 2009; Pollard et al., 2008; Prpich et al., 2011; Taylor,
2013). Without a deep understanding of the interplay between these
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overarching purpose of this research therefore was to explore the views
of policy ofﬁcials engaged in the better regulation debate, and their
views on instrument selection related to risk. We sought to examine
the axis between regulatory design, for a range of policy domains as to
their risks, and the perceived effectiveness that interventions have on
the management and reduction of risks within that domain. Our exam-
inations have wider appeal given the prioritisation of policy effort (and
public funds) directed towards strategic risks faced by the UK, and else-
where.We therefore ask: (a) howdo policy ofﬁcials perceive the effective-
ness of existing or proposed interventions in reducing risk? (b) what place
does risk reduction, as a desired policy outcome, play in instrument selec-
tion? (c) to what extent and how do policy ofﬁcials connect with these as-
pects during instrument selection?
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Sample and procedure
We analysed 14 in-depth, semi-structured interviews from an orig-
inal interview set conducted in 2013 with 33 policy ofﬁcials across 25
policy domains. Each of the 14 interviews, selected as those with richer
extended text, focused on a speciﬁc area of Defra's policy work, for ex-
ample waste management, or marine licensing. A full list of policy do-
mains is in Table 1. The original interviewer (CMT) spoke with
between one and three policy staff at a time and interviews lasted be-
tween 27 and 67 mins. Prior to the original interview, interviewees
had been provided with the aims of the research. At the outset, a sum-
mary was provided by the interviewer (CMT) reiterating the desired
focus. Interviewees were encouraged to speak freely, though CMT pro-
vided minor guidance and prompting (Appendix) to ensure the discus-
sion remained ‘on topic’.
2.2. Quantitative content analysis
For a re-analysis of these interviews, a quantitative content analysis
(QCA) was used to answer the research questions and obtain replicable
ﬁndings. QCA ensures the data is statistically comparable
(Muehlenhaus, 2010), allowing for objective measurements of differ-
ence. To carry out QCA effectively and validly, research questions must
be determined through the prior establishment of relevant themes
and codes. Each of the 14 extended interviews was therefore codedTable 1
Count and % distribution of references to instruments for 14 Defra policy domains.
Policy domain Command and
control
Co- and
self-regulatio
N % N %
Biodiversity 18a 8.33 9 8
Food 32 14.81 14 1
Marine strategy 28 12.96 16 1
Common ﬁsheries policy 29 13.43 6 5
Peat and soils 10 4.63 10 9
Contaminated land 15 6.94 6 5
Food and Environmental Research Agencyb 21 9.72 7 6
Waste management 4 1.85 4 3
Noise regulation 10 4.63 1 0
Chemicals regulation 18 8.33 5 4
Marine licensing 8 3.70 3 2
Local environmental protectionc 11 5.09 6 5
Livestock and livestock products 6 2.78 3 2
Sustainable consumption and production 6 2.78 12 1
Total 216 100 102 1
a Bold text refers to prominent instruments noted in interview.
b The Food and Environmental Research Agency, an executive agency of Defra and internatio
food and feed quality and chemical safety in the environment.
c Local environmental protection relates to Defra's interactions with local authorities who haseparately by the researcher (EAG) using NVivo™ software (Bazeley,
2007). The unit of coding was the paragraph and, where relevant, mul-
tiple codeswere applied to the same paragraph. That is, ifmore than one
relevant theme was mentioned within a paragraph, the paragraph was
assigned to each relevant code. Regulatory instruments were
categorised into ﬁve key categories (Taylor et al., 2012): ‘command
and control’ regulation; co- and self-regulation; economic instruments;
information based instruments; and support mechanisms (Fig. 1;
Table 1). Few interviewees could meaningfully distinguish between
co- and self-regulation and these categories were collapsed into a single
one.
Our analytical approach drew from frame analysis, which is
employed to analyse how the media presents information to the public
by aggregating the number of ‘pro’ or ‘con’ statements relating to a
given topic (Pan and Kosicki, 1993). For this study, references to regula-
tory instruments were coded as positive, negative or neutral, on the
basis of how they were discussed by interviewees with regards to
their perceived effectiveness. Environmental risks were predominantly
coded using pre-determined risk categories reported by Soane et al.
(2016). Previous work by the authors had informed the expression of
these policy level risks. Risks included derogations to air quality and
risks to the loss of biodiversity, for example (Fig. 2a). However, somead-
ditional and unique codes, derived from a lexicon of policy level risks
generated during a Defra-funded programme of research on strategic
risk management described by Prpich et al. (2011) were required for
further risk categories that were identiﬁed during the previous study,
such as land contamination and invasive species (Fig. 2b).
2.3. Overlap analysis for instruments and risk reduction
We were interested in whether policy ofﬁcials could express a con-
nection between the instruments discussed for various policy domains
(Table 1) and accepted approaches to risk reduction for these domains.
To test this, we used a strategic risk analysis, reported for Defra policy
domains elsewhere (Prpich et al., 2011) (Fig. 2a–c), to which risk
characterisationswere added for the full set of risks discussed by the re-
search team.
References to environmental risks were identiﬁed throughout the
interviews. These consisted of 18 named risks by reference to 14 Defra
policy domains presented in Table 1. References to each of the 18
named risks were compiled into new codes that corresponded to the
proposed risk characterisation in Fig. 2a,b, by reference to likelihoodn
Economic
instruments
Information-based
instruments
Support
mechanisms
N % N % N %
.82 – – – – 6 5.66
3.72 2 3.51 9 14.29 8 7.55
5.69 1 1.75 4 6.35 4 3.77
.88 1 1.75 1 1.58 6 5.66
.80 1 1.75 4 6.35 7 6.60
.88 – – 6 9.52 9 8.49
.86 1 1.75 11 17.46 20 18.87
.92 17 29.82 5 7.94 7 6.60
.98 2 3.51 2 3.17 5 4.72
.90 2 3.51 5 7.94 6 5.66
.94 2 3.51 3 4.76 12 11.32
.88 12 21.05 2 3.17 4 3.77
.94 4 7.02 2 3.17 8 7.55
1.76 12 21.05 9 14.29 4 3.77
00 57 100 63 100 106 100
nal centre of excellence for plant and bee health, crop protection, sustainable agriculture,
ve regulatory duties and power most notably in relation to local air quality management.
(a) Policy-level risks from Soane et al. (2016) (b) risks characterised in this analysis
(c) Risk management strategies and instruments by reference to risk character
Fig. 2. Risk characterisation. Strategic analysis of policy-level risks and taxonomy of instrument by reference to risk character (FMD, foot and mouth disease; ENM engineered
nanomaterials; GMOs, genetically modiﬁed organisms; Bovine TB, bovine tuberculosis).
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‘plant health’ and ‘overﬁshing’ (Fig. 2b) were combined to form the
new code of ‘moderate/severe’ as bothwere presented as having amod-
erate likelihood and a severe impact. To determine which types of in-
strument were associated with each character of risk by policy ofﬁcials
in the interviews, an ‘overlap analysis’ was conducted with NVivo™.
The analysis highlighted references where risk categories overlapped
with references from the regulatory instrument category codes. For ex-
ample, a reference coded to ‘moderate/severe risk’ and to ‘command
and control’was counted as an overlapping code. Byway of background,
Taylor (2013) previously hypothesised a mapping of risk type to 6 in-
strument categories (column 3; Fig. 1).3. Results
3.1. Instrument preferences by policy domain
Table 1 presents the overall count and percent distribution of refer-
ences by interviewees to the ﬁve key instrument categories for 14 Defra
policy domains. It records the general preference in the transcripts (in
bold) for ‘command and control’ (N = 257) and support mechanisms
(N = 118) and, for each domain, the most cited instrument category.
These can be reconciled by reference to existing approaches to the reg-
ulation of risks presented by these policy domains; e.g. ‘command and
control’ regulation for contaminated land (N = 15), a policy domain
106
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and local councils on the remediation of contaminated sites; or waste
management which beneﬁts from an effective economic instrument
(N= 17), the landﬁll tax, to divert wastes from landﬁll disposal.3.2. Frame analysis by instrument category
For the ﬁve key instrument categories, each code was categorised as
positively, negatively or neutrally-framed. Framing was determined by
EAG using references in the transcript. As a global data set across all pol-
icy domains, positively framed references accounted for just over half of
all references (55%, N = 344), with negative references accounting for
21% (129), and neutral referencing comprising the remaining 24%
(146). Fig. 3 is a stacked histogram of positive, negative and neutrally-
framed references for ﬁve instrument categories. Economic instruments
had the greatest percentage of positive references (73%) and the lowest
percentage of negative references (8%) relative to the total number of
references within the category. Command and control had the greatest
percentage of negative references (37%) relative to the total category,
though this category was referred to substantially more than each of
the other four.
Next, the ‘command and control’ code was further categorised into
ﬁve sub-categories (Fig. 4). References to EU directives and the
European Commission (EU/EC; Fig. 4) were the most prevalent, with
this category having the greatest number of references framed posi-
tively (N = 45), negatively (N = 36) and neutrally (N = 41). The
local authority category possessed the greatest portion of positive refer-
ences within the ‘command and control’ category, while the greatest
percentage of negative references was in the legislation category.45
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Fig. 4. Command and control sub-categories, with positive, negative and neutrally framed
references for each sub category.Overall, ‘command and control’ was predominantly positive with 44%
of references coded to that frame.
Co- and self-regulation (combined) were categorised into four sub-
categories (Fig. 5). Of the four, voluntary measures were discussed to
a greater extent with 58 positively framed references. Agreements, the
role of the private sector and voluntary measures each possessed a
large proportion of positive references. Self-regulation was mostly
discussed in a negative manner, with 46% of all references framed neg-
atively in that category. Overall, 54% of references to co-regulatory and
self-regulatory instruments were positive.
Economic instruments (Fig. 6) were reduced to four sub-categories,
predominantly discussed in a positive manner; with general economic
drivers comprising themajority of the references. Almost three quarters
(73%) of references to economic instrumentswere positive, with just 8%
negative. However, it should be noted that the total number of positive
references overall was 49.
Information based instruments also formed four sub-categories
(Fig. 7). Targeted information provision was rated most positively
with 82% (N = 28) of references coded as positive. Civic regulation
was shown to have the greatest percentage of negatively framed refer-
ences with three negative references (38%). Over two thirds (70%) of
references in the information based category were framed positively
(N = 49).
Finally, support mechanisms were sub-categorised into three areas
(Fig. 8). Network building and problem-solving exhibited the greatest
number of positively framed references (N = 33). Raising awareness
was shown to have the greatest percentage of positive references
(79%) and lowest percentage of negative references (8%) relative to21
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to support mechanisms were mostly positively framed (69%).
3.3. Instrument selection and risk reduction
Notwithstanding the value of policy ofﬁcials' perspectives on these in-
terventions in the midst of a better regulation debate, to what extent do
policy ofﬁcials correlate key instrument categories (Table 1; Fig. 3) with
the risk reduction strategies these instruments are accepted to deliver?
Ideally, one might hypothesise a strongly positive framing of ‘command
and control’ by ofﬁcials, as a category of intervention deemed effective
atmanaging risks in need ofﬁrm andprompt enforcement. If this hypoth-
esis was to hold, one might expect ofﬁcials to map ﬁrm ‘command and
control’ regulation to policy domains where residual risks were deemed
to be high (Fig. 2b). If this capability was well-developed among policy
staff, regulatory control, and thus instrument selection, might be antici-
pated to mirror the character of the harms presented by the risk
(Sparrow, 2000, 2008). However, to temper this with reality, Fig. 9 pre-
sents the framing analysis for ‘command and control’ from our dataset
for 3 policy domains (Food, Marine strategy, and regulation of the Com-
mon Fisheries Policy; CFP) with the greatest citation of this instrument
category and the varying distribution of positive, neutral and negative ref-
erences accordingly. Rather than reﬂecting a uniformly positive perspec-
tive, a variety of responses exists. Further, as discussed below, policy
ofﬁcials did not closely correlate the management of high likelihood/se-
vere impact risks in general with command and control interventions,
suggesting there additional inﬂuences beyond risk character are at play.
The overlap analysis described in Section 2.3 above is this study's at-
tempt to examine a possible matching between instrument type and19
30
33
2
7
11
3
6
7
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Raising Awareness Evidence Network Building and
Problem Solving
secnerefeRf oreb
muN
Instrument Type
Posive Negave Neutral
Fig. 8. Support mechanism sub-categories, with positive, negative and neutral frames.risk characterisations for the 18 risks named in the interview set and
characterised accordingly (Table 2).
A set of normalised histograms (Fig. 10a–e) illustrates the extent of
overlap for each of the characterisations of risk (e.g. high likelihood/se-
vere impact) for each of the ﬁve governance and regulation categories.
4. Discussion
4.1. What do policy ofﬁcials make of instruments in general?
Policy ofﬁcials in Defra are clearly familiar (Table 1) with the opera-
tion of ‘command and control’ regulation (EU/EC regulation; Fig. 4) and
the use of support mechanisms (evidence, network building and prob-
lem solving; Fig. 8) as two means of driving policy outcomes; though
there are mixed views on whether ‘command and control’ approaches
are necessary in all of the circumstances in which they are currently
used (Fig. 4). For policy domains where multiple actors exist – the
management of peat and soils quality and moves towards sustainable
consumption and production – the data (Table 1) suggests awareness
of co- and self-regulatorymechanisms to deliver change through volun-
tary measures (Fig. 5), though there are mixed views on effectiveness.
This greater consideration of voluntary agreements is to be expected
given the substantive momentum behind better regulation at the time
of the interviews and an effective in-house unit coordinating Defra's ef-
forts (Defra, 2011b, 2012, 2013). Table 1 also infers knowledge about
risks where economic and ﬁscal instruments have been deployed,
waste and local air quality management for example, with positive per-
spectives (Fig. 6) on taxes and subsidies and general economic drivers
as effective instruments. We also note the high credit given to
information-based instruments (Table 1, note food and FERA-centred
activities) as alternative instruments within these domains. Overall,
Table 1 and the attending Figs. 4–8 present a picture of a wider consid-
eration of the potential policy instruments to use: there is sound under-
standing of instruments in use; a developing understanding of
alternatives; and mixed views of their effectiveness.
4.2. To what extent is risk discussed in instrument selection?
A preliminary analysis in Taylor (2013) illustrated the extent of un-
derstanding among Defra policy ofﬁcials about risk and economics con-
cepts, summarised in Section 1.1. Building on this, Fig. 10a–f
summarises the extent to which their discussions of instrument cate-
gory for 18 named risks were accompanied by references to their spe-
ciﬁc risk character (Fig. 2a,b; and by the nominations ‘high/severe’;
‘high/moderate’ etc.; Table 2; column 6). In short: (i) did policy ofﬁcials
map the instrument category to the magnitude of the risk, as
hypothesised by Taylor (2013; Fig. 1); and (ii) did they give suitable
Table 2
Illustration of number of references and sources for each environmental risk type with their respective risk characterisations denoted by group, for ease of comparison.
Risk characterisationa Category (see Fig. 10a–f)
Named risk type References (no.) Sources Likelihood Impact severity
Floodingb 1 1 H S High/severe10a
Resource depletion 3 2 H S
Impact to biodiversity 14 5 H M High/moderate10b
Marine biodiversity 5 3 H M
Habitat risk 6 2 H M
Animal health 5 1 H M
Plant health 9 1 M S Moderate/severe10c
Overﬁshing 3 1 M S
Air quality 6 3 M M Moderate/moderate10d
Water quality 10 7 M M
Pesticides 1 1 M M
Soil risk 6 1 M M
Invasive species 7 2 M M
Noise 8 1 M M
(Exotic animal) disease spread 5 1 M M
Coastal erosion 1 1 M L Moderate/low10e
Land contamination 9 2 M L
Nanomaterials 5 2 L L Low/low10f
a Risk characterisations by reference to Fig. 2a,b, as High, Severe; Moderate and Low.
b Named risks grouped by risk character ‘couples’ for ease of comparison with ﬁgs. below.
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managing the particular risk (Fig. 2c)?
Citation analysis (the length of the grey bars in Fig. 10c,d,e) was gen-
erally greater for ‘high/moderate’; ‘moderate/severe’; and ‘moderate/
moderate’ risks than for the more extreme ‘high/severe and ‘low/low’
risk characterisations. This may reﬂect the greater uncertainty that ex-
ists in the middle of the ‘risk × impact’ schematic (Fig. 2c) and thereby
an enhanced reference to risk, or the number of named risks assigned to
these particular categories (Table 2, column 6) compared to the others.
Turning to the extent of overlap – the mapping of risk character to in-
strument type – Fig. 10a–f suggests a poor degree of sense making at
the time of the interviews between risk character and instrument effec-
tiveness. Mixed regulatory strategies are to be expected for risks of
mixed character (Fig. 2c) because these are generally uncertain, com-
plex in character and require formalised risk analysis to resolve their
signiﬁcance in likelihood and consequence terms. This appears to be
borne out by Fig. 10c,d,e, though the absence of a close mapping for
command and control’ strategies for ‘high/severe’ risks is surprising
given the preliminary ﬁnding noted in 1.2 above. We are cautious
about conclusions when coding overlaps occur. The clearest single ex-
ample is in Fig. 10d for ‘command and control’ and for those risks
deemed ‘moderate/moderate’ (Table 2), and where support mecha-
nisms also feature.4.3. What does this tell us about instrument design and risk?
It would naïve to assume that the character (or signiﬁcance) of a
public risk in need of regulation, because of market failure, was the
sole factor in selecting the instrument tomanage it; or even that a single
instrument alone could deliver the extent of risk reduction required
(Sinclair, 1997; Jones, 2007; Angus and GHK-ICF, 2013). As Taylor ex-
plains (Taylor et al., 2012; Taylor, 2013; Fig. 1), there are multiple
criteria in play during instrument selections. This said, policy makers
and researchers have made progress (e.g. German Advisory Council on
Global Change, 1998; Gandy, 1999; Klinke and Renn, 2002; Prpich
et al., 2011; International Risk Governance Council, 2011; Kuklicke
and Demeritt, 2016) in connecting risk character with the means by
which risks can be managed – most obviously, ‘low likelihood/severe
impact’ risks requiring contingency planning and information provi-
sion; and ‘high likelihood/severe impact’ risks requiring ﬁrm actionnow. However, our results suggest more knowledge exchange is re-
quired between the risk analysis and policy maker communities.
Within the support mechanisms category is the sub-category of ‘ev-
idence’. Evidencewas referred to 43 times andwasmentioned in twelve
of the fourteen interviews. Thirty of these references were framed pos-
itively, andmostly related to the importance of using and gathering ev-
idence to inform and support policy decisions. Overall, it was stated that
there is a need for clear evidence to support their work, and where no
evidence is available, this is problematic. Some of the discussion re-
ferred to the effectiveness of evidence based decisions and the impor-
tance using evidence to inform their processes, a discussion initiated
by Garnett et al. (2016). Respected evidence is valuable and has the po-
tential to havewider impacts and inform industrywhatworks.More ev-
idence is therefore needed to evaluate the risks in terms of severity and
impact. The importance of evidence was noted across risk categories
and in relation to all policy instruments. While evidence was
categorised as an instrument for the purpose of this research, it is evi-
dent that it is also required to support many of the other instruments
outlined above.
5. Conclusions
We return to our aims: (a) how do policy ofﬁcials perceive the effec-
tiveness of existing or proposed interventions in reducing risk? (b) what
place does risk reduction, as a desired policy outcome, play in instrument
selection? (c) to what extent and how do policy ofﬁcials connect with
these aspects during instrument selection?. This is the ﬁrst evaluation of
policy ofﬁcials' perspectives of instrument selection by reference to
risk (see graphical abstract). Thoughmodest in its scope, it appears pol-
icy ofﬁcials possess a sound grounding in generic risk and economic
concepts, perhaps through their training in formal policy appraisal
within government and in cost-beneﬁt analysis. Similarly, their under-
standing of conventional regulatory instruments is well grounded and
furnished with occasional examples of alternatives, such as economic
instruments, information-driven instruments and voluntary agree-
ments. However, beyond the generalities of the need for risk reduction
through ‘command and control’, there is a need to understand other fac-
tors that affect instrument choice and improve the connection between
the signiﬁcance and character of riskswith instrument choice – not only
in the Government department sponsoring policy development, but
also through engagement with other government departments.
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Fig. 10. a–f. Normalised stackedhistograms illustrating overlap between codes for likelihood/impact risks of varying character (e.g.moderate likelihood/low impact; panel e, scale adjusted
according to best ﬁt).
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Appendix A. Sample interview questions
Question 1. Before we meet I will review the main areas of policy
that I understand fall within your responsibility, and will begin the dis-
cussion by checking this understanding with you.Question 2. The typology of instruments in Table 1 provides a broad
categorisation of types of policy option that policy makers can choose
from. Do you think this typology is comprehensive? Can you identify
any signiﬁcant gaps?
Question 3. I wish to compile a set of examples of policy instruments
from UK environmental policy that have worked in practice, to use as
data to compare with theories of what works when and why. Which
policy instruments are you aware of that have worked well? Why has
this been the case, and how has their effectiveness been demonstrated?
Question 4. Which policy instruments are you aware of that have
worked less well? Why do you think this has been the case?
Question 5. Do you think policy in your area could be improved? Is
there scope to make more use of approaches other than direct
regulation?
Question 6. Thinking about the typology of instruments and the ex-
amples you have identiﬁed, which factors do you think determine
whether or not a policy instrument will be effective for a given policy
context?
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